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STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL PERIOD 
CALCULATIONS FOR DISMISSED AND REFILED 
CHARGES: 
A CASE STUDY OF COLORADO’S APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being arrested and charged with a crime. Months pass, and your 
trial is continuously delayed because of congestion in the court’s calendar 
and the prosecution’s lack of preparation. You know that, in Colorado, the 
State only has six months to bring you to trial,1 but five and a half months 
after your plea of not guilty, you still have yet to be tried. After all this time, 
just before the six-month speedy trial period expires, the charges against 
you are dropped. After months of legal stress, you breathe a sigh of relief. 
And then, months or even years later, the prosecution refiles the same 
charges against you again—and you are shocked to discover your six-month 
speedy trial period, previously just weeks from expiring, restarts from zero. 
The prosecution now gets another six months to bring you to trial on the 
previously dismissed charges.  
The situation described above is a reality for some defendants who face 
criminal charges in Colorado. This Note analyzes the application of 
Colorado’s statutory six-month speedy trial period when charges are 
dismissed and later refiled. Under Colorado law, the speedy trial period 
restarts for refiled charges,2 unless the defendant can prove that the 
prosecution “indiscriminately” dismissed and refiled the charges in order to 
circumvent the speedy trial mandate.3 However, no Colorado court to date 
has held that a defendant has met this difficult burden of proving that the 
prosecution dismissed and refiled the charges specifically to circumvent the 
six-month speedy trial period.4 This Note suggests that Colorado courts 
have created too big of a loophole in Colorado’s statutory right to a speedy 
trial through their longstanding precedent of allowing the speedy trial 
window to restart following the prosecution’s dismissal and later refiling of 
 
1. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405(1) (West 2019). 
2. Colorado’s six-month statutory window technically starts (and restarts) when the defendant’s 
not-guilty plea is entered, and not from the time when charges are refiled. § 18-1-405(1). However, this 
Note will use “when charges are refiled” as a shorthand to refer to the point from which the speedy trial 
clock starts and/or restarts, even though refiling is not technically the time when the clock starts in 
Colorado, nor in every other state with a speedy trial statute. 
3. Meehan v. Cty. Court ex rel. Cty. of Jefferson, 762 P.2d 725, 726 (Colo. App. 1988) 
(emphasis added); see also Huang v. Cty. Court of Douglas Cty., 98 P.3d 924, 928 (Colo. App. 2004); 
People v. Allen, 885 P.2d 207, 210 (Colo. 1994) (en banc); People v. Dunhill, 570 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Colo. App. 1977). 
4. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 











the same charges. Therefore, this Note argues that Colorado should not 
restart the speedy trial window for refiled charges, but rather toll the speedy 
trial window during the period between when the charges are dismissed and 
refiled. 
Part I of this Note will first provide an overview of the speedy trial 
protections found in both the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Part 
II will summarize Colorado’s speedy trial requirements, stemming from 
both statutes and case law, detailing when the speedy trial period restarts for 
refiled charges. More precisely, Part II will explain that Colorado’s statutory 
speedy trial period generally restarts when charges are refiled (the 
“restarting” approach). Part III will explain other states’ approaches to 
calculating the statutory speedy trial period for refiled charges. Specifically, 
Part III will describe three alternative approaches for calculating the speedy 
trial period when charges are dismissed and refiled: letting the speedy trial 
period continue to run after the charges are initially dismissed (the 
“continuous” approach); calculating the speedy trial period from when the 
charges are originally filed but pausing the clock between when the initial 
charges are dismissed and then later refiled (the “tacking-and-tolling” 
approach); or a hybrid approach combining the restarting and the tacking-
and-tolling approaches (the “hybrid” approach).5  
Next, Part IV will argue that Colorado’s current approach of restarting 
the speedy trial period for refiled charges does not adequately protect 
Coloradans’ statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial. Part IV will 
argue that the better approach is the tacking-and-tolling approach, meaning 
calculating the speedy trial period using the initial, not refiled, charges as a 
starting point, while not including the period between dismissal and refiling 
in the calculation.6 Because of tacking-and-tolling’s relative benefits, Part 
V will propose replacing Colorado’s current restarting approach with the 
tacking-and-tolling approach. Finally, Part VI will discuss this Note’s 
applicability to other states with speedy trial statutes similar to Colorado’s. 
More specifically, Part VI will note that, while each state’s statutory speedy 
trial landscape is unique because it is also influenced by other factors, such 
as statutes of limitations, the arguments in tacking-and-tolling’s favor are 
broadly applicable to most states that have a concrete speedy trial period 
prescribed by statute. Thus, this Note’s arguments for adopting the tacking-
and-tolling approach apply not just in Colorado, but in any state with a 
concrete statutory speedy trial period that does not yet follow the tacking-
and-tolling approach. 
 
5. See Table 1 for a description and examples of the four approaches. 












I. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL PROTECTIONS 
A. United States Constitutional Speedy Trial Protections: The Due 
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment 
The Federal Constitution protects the right to a speedy trial through both 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment7 and the Sixth 
Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause.8 This Section will describe, in turn, the 
protections found in the Due Process Clause, then the Sixth Amendment, as 
interpreted by the courts. 
First, courts’ interpretations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause provide a narrow speedy trial protection by forbidding “oppressive 
delay.”9 However, the United States Supreme Court has been clear that the 
Due Process Clause only has “a limited role to play in protecting against 
oppressive delay.”10 To prevail on an oppressive delay claim, “the defendant 
must prove (1) the delay resulted in substantial prejudice to his rights, and 
(2) the prosecution intentionally delayed prosecution in order to gain a 
tactical advantage.”11 Thus, the Due Process Clause protects the right to a 
speedy trial in a few, albeit “limited,” circumstances. 
In addition to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s protection 
against oppressive delay, the United States Constitution’s Sixth 
Amendment explicitly provides defendants the right to a speedy trial.12 To 
determine if a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been 
violated, courts apply the balancing test established in Barker v. Wingo,13 
which uses factors including the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, 
 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy . . . trial.” (emphasis added)). 
9. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1977) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 
U.S. 307 (1971)).  
10. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). 
11. United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 465 (10th Cir. 2006). Most circuits follow 
this formulation of an oppressive delay claim. Eli DuBosar, Note, Pre-Accusation Delay: An Issue Ripe 
for Adjudication by the United States Supreme Court, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 665–69 (2013). 
However, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits apply a slightly more lenient oppressive delay test, not requiring 
substantial prejudice and instead applying a test that balances the prosecution’s reason for delay with 
the prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 670. Colorado courts have provided inconsistent guidance on the 
exact elements of an oppressive delay claim, but have broadly followed Abdush-Shakur’s formulation 
requiring some form of prejudice combined with some type of prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 681; 
see infra notes 143–149 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties in proving a Due 
Process Clause oppressive delay claim. 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy . . . trial.” (emphasis added)). This Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to state 
criminal cases through the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 
(1967). 
13. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 











the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”14 
However, in United States v. MacDonald,15 the United States Supreme 
Court held that dismissing and refiling the same charges does not 
necessarily violate a defendant’s right to a speedy trial: “[T]he Speedy Trial 
Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, 
formally drops charges.”16 Thus, courts cannot include the time between 
when the Government, acting in good faith, drops and later refiles the same 
charges in analyzing whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
rights have been violated.17  
Instead, “[a]ny undue delay after charges are dismissed, like any delay 
before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, 
not the Speedy Trial Clause [of the Sixth Amendment].”18 This is because, 
unlike the Due Process Clause, the “Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial 
is . . . not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by 
passage of time.”19 Rather, the  
speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of 
lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but 
nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an 
accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life 
caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.20  
Because of the importance of these protections, speedy trial rights have 
been “considered fundamental” since even before this country’s founding, 
 
14. Id. at 530. 
15. 456 U.S. 1 (1982). 
16. Id. at 7. 
17. Id.  
18. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in excluding the period between when charges are dismissed and 
later refiled, the MacDonald Court’s approach is similar to (and arguably the same as) the tacking-and-
tolling approach. However, MacDonald does not “directly” answer the question whether “the period 
from the initial filing of the charges until the dismissal of those charges is relevant.” People v. Nelson, 
360 P.3d 175, 181–82 (Colo. App. 2014). Instead, the Nelson court held that MacDonald’s rationale 
indirectly “supports the conclusion that [the] period [between the initial filing of charges and dismissal] 
counts” towards the length of delay for constitutional speedy trial purposes. Id. But see United States v. 
Artez, 290 F. App’x 203, 208 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting contradicting cases interpreting MacDonald as 
requiring the tacking-and-tolling approach or the restarting approach). See also infra note 236 and 
accompanying text. 
19. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8. 
20. Id.; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (“[T]he major evils protected 
against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s 
defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee 
has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, 
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, 













dating back to the Magna Carta.21 Thus, the right to a speedy trial “is one of 
the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.”22 Due to the 
importance of speedy trial rights, violations of the Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial require 
the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment . . . . 
This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a 
defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without 
having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an 
exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only 
possible remedy.23 
Thus, violations of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial require a 
dismissal.24  
B. Colorado’s Constitutional Speedy Trial Protections 
Colorado’s State Constitution similarly protects a defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial: “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . 
a speedy public trial.”25 
Because Colorado’s constitutional speedy trial protections mirror the 
Federal Constitution’s,26 Colorado courts have held that similar interests 
underlie both the federal and state constitutional speedy trial protections, 
namely “the defendant’s right to be free from the anxiety accompanying a 
public accusation and society’s need for a speedy and final determination of 
criminal charges.”27 However, these “speedy trial provisions are not 
intended to be applied in a wooden or mechanistic fashion” due to the 
“countervailing interest in effective enforcement of the criminal laws.”28 
 
21. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 225 (1967) (noting that the right to a speedy 
trial “has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first articulation in modern 
jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta”).  
22. Id. at 226.  
23. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
24. Id. 
25. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16. 
26. People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792, 796 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); see also People v. Watson, 666 
P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. App. 1983), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 700 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1985). 
27. Deason, 670 P.2d at 796 n.10. More specifically, constitutional speedy trial provisions serve 
the purposes of the  
minimization of the anxiety and concern resulting to a defendant from public accusation, and 
the prevention of prejudice to the accused arising from long delays. . . . The more general public 
interest is also served by an early determination of guilt “so that the innocent may be exonerated 
and the guilty punished.” 
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (quoting Jaramillo v. Dist. Court, 484 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Colo. 1971) (en banc)). 
28. Sanchez, 649 P.2d at 1052. 











Because Colorado’s constitutional protections mirror the federal ones, 
state constitutional speedy trial violations are examined using a similar test 
as federal violations under Barker,29 relying on the same four factors: “the 
length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of 
his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the defendant.”30 Thus, a 
holding that a defendant has not been denied a speedy trial under the 
Colorado Constitution “requires . . . the concomitant finding that the 
requirements of the United States Constitution concerning speedy trial have 
also been met.”31 
For this reason, consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s 
analysis in United States v. MacDonald,32 the Colorado Constitution’s 
Article II Section 16 speedy trial right does not apply when the prosecution 
dismisses the charges in good faith, because then, no charges are pending.33 
Under this logic, “a dismissal entered before jeopardy attaches is not 
equivalent to an acquittal and does not operate to bar a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense.”34 Likewise, because a dismissal before 
trial is “not a final judgment on the merits of the case,” neither res judicata 
nor collateral estoppel apply to preclude future prosecutions based on the 
same crime as the dismissed charges.35 
In very limited circumstances, Colorado courts have held that the Due 
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment36 and Colorado Constitution37 may protect defendants from 
prosecutorial dismissal and refiling of the same charges.38 In People v. 
Abrahamsen,39 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s 
repeated dismissal and subsequent refiling of the same charges throughout 
a one-year period, “although procedurally within the law, in fact violated 
the due process requirement of fundamental fairness.”40 The court noted that 
the repeated dismissals and refilings “required the defendant to make 
multiple court appearances and subjected the defendant to excessive 
expense in defending himself, and to unwarranted prolonged anxiety and 
 
29. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
30. People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148, 154 (Colo. 1981) (en banc). 
31. Lucero v. People, 476 P.2d 257, 259 (Colo. 1970) (en banc). 
32. 456 U.S. 1 (1982). 
33. People v. Watson, 666 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. App. 1983), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 
700 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1985); see also People v. Castango, 674 P.2d 978, 981 (Colo. App. 1983). 
34. People v. Abrahamsen, 489 P.2d 206, 209 (Colo. 1971) (en banc). 
35. Id. 
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
37. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law.”). 
38. Abrahamsen, 489 P.2d at 209; see also People v. Aragon, 643 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1982) (en 
banc). 
39. 489 P.2d 206 (Colo. 1971). 












concern under the circumstances. In addition, [the] defendant was placed 
under the cloud of undetermined criminal charges for an indeterminate and 
unreasonable period of time.”41 Thus, the Due Process Clauses of the United 
States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and Colorado Constitution 
protect defendants in the limited circumstance of repeated dismissals and 
refilings of the same charges. 
In sum, both the United States and Colorado Constitutions’ speedy trial 
and Due Process Clauses—as interpreted by the courts—offer some speedy 
trial protections, albeit in three, limited circumstances. First, the state and 
federal Constitutions’ speedy trial clauses protect against prolonged pre-
trial delays using Barker’s four-part balancing test when charges are 
pending, but not when they have been dismissed (and are later refiled).42 
Second, both Constitutions’ Due Process Clauses protect against oppressive 
delay in cases of prosecutorial misbehavior.43 Third, both Constitutions’ 
Due Process Clauses protect against the repeated dismissal and refiling of 
the same charges.44 
II. COLORADO STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL SPEEDY TRIAL REQUIREMENTS 
In addition to the constitutional protections discussed in Part I, Colorado 
provides defendants a statutory right to a speedy trial within six months of 
their initial not-guilty plea, barring certain excluded time periods.45 This 
Section will discuss Colorado’s speedy trial landscape generally, then turn 
to Colorado’s approach to calculating the statutory speedy trial period when 
the prosecution initially dismisses and then later refiles the same charges.  
 
41. Id. 
42. See supra Part I. 
43. See supra Part I. 
44. See supra Part I(B). 
45. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405 (West 2019). Periods omitted when computing the 
speedy trial period under the statute include: 
[a]ny period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by 
reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination at any time after 
the issue of the defendant's mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental 
condition is raised; . . . [t]he period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether 
commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution; . . . [a] reasonable period of delay when 
the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and 
there is good cause for not granting a severance; . . . [t]he period of delay resulting from the 
voluntary absence or unavailability of the defendant; . . . [t]he period of delay caused by any 
mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial; . . . [t]he period of any delay caused at 
the instance of the defendant.  
§ 18-1-405(6)(a)–(f). Additionally, certain types of delays “not exceeding six months resulting from a 
continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant” are 
excluded from the calculation. § 18-1-405(6)(g). 











A. Colorado’s Speedy Trial Statute Generally 
In order to implement the state’s constitutional speedy trial protections,46 
Colorado gives defendants a statutory right to a speedy trial within six 
months of their not-guilty plea under Colorado Revised Statute Section 18-
1-405 (Section 18-1-405).47 The burden of complying with the statutory 
speedy trial mandate is on the prosecution and the court.48  
While Section 18-1-405 is intended to “clarify and simplify” the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial,49 it can nonetheless “be violated 
without proof of violation of the underlying constitutional guarantee.”50 
Even without demonstrating a constitutional violation, under Colorado’s 
statute, when a defendant is not brought to trial within the six-month 
window, “and no allowable extensions or exclusions are applicable, then the 
charges against the defendant must be dismissed.”51 After a dismissal for a 
statutory speedy trial violation, “the defendant shall not again be indicted, 
informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense 
based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal 
episode.”52 Thus, Colorado’s remedy for statutory speedy trial violations is 
a dismissal that bars refiling the same charges, leaving courts and 
prosecutors little discretion to refile after a violation. When Section 18-1-
 
46. People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792, 796 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (“The speedy trial statute is 
intended to implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial.”). 
47. § 18-1-405(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to 
trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date 
of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to 
bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall 
not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based 
upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.”); see also COLO. R. CRIM. 
P. 48(b)(1). Whereas the statutory speedy trial period begins with a not-guilty plea, both the federal and 
state “constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches with the filing of a formal charge.” People v. Chavez, 
779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (emphasis added).  
48. Marquez v. Dist. Court ex rel. Tenth Judicial Dist., 613 P.2d 1302, 1303–04 (Colo. 1980) (en 
banc). This “burden includes making a record sufficient for an appellate court to determine statutory 
compliance.” Id. at 1304.  
49. Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (quoting Carr v. Dist. Court ex 
rel. Eighth Judicial Dist., 543 P.2d 1253, 1254 (Colo. 1975)); see also Nagi v. People, 389 P.3d 875, 
877 (Colo. 2017) (holding that Section 18-1-405 “is designed to effect” “the federal and state 
constitutional guarantees” to a speedy trial); People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Colo. 1982) (en 
banc). 
50. Watson, 700 P.2d at 548. 
51. Tongish v. Arapahoe Cty. Court, 775 P.2d 63, 64 (Colo. App. 1989); see also COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405 (West 2019); Watson, 700 P.2d at 548. 
52. § 18-1-405(1). In contrast to Colorado’s statute mandatorily prohibiting refiling charges after 
a speedy trial violation, the federal system allows judges discretion to dismiss the charges either with or 












405 is violated, the court must dismiss the charges; “the mandatory language 
of the statutory provision leaves no room for court discretion.”53 
B. Escape Hatches: Colorado’s Speedy Trial Statute Excludes Several 
Periods from the Six-Month Window 
Despite the six-month statutory speedy trial mandate, the prosecution 
can ask the courts for additional time on top of the six-month period, without 
the defendant’s consent, in several circumstances.54 First, the six-month 
window does not include delay caused by the prosecution’s interlocutory 
appeal.55 Second, it does not include delay “when the defendant is joined 
for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and 
there is good cause for not granting a severance.”56 Third, Colorado’s six-
month speedy trial window can be tolled for an additional six months, 
without the defendant’s consent, when the prosecutor requests a 
continuance because of the unavailability of evidence:  
The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a 
continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, 
without the consent of the defendant [is excluded], if . . . [t]he 
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence 
material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has 
exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at 
the later date . . . .57 
Fourth, Colorado’s six-month window can be tolled for an additional six 
months, without the defendant’s consent, when the prosecutor requests a 
continuance for felony trials under “exceptional circumstances”:  
The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a 
continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, 
 
53. Watson, 700 P.2d at 548; see also People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo. 1997) (en 
banc) (“The language of section 18-1-405(1) is mandatory and leaves no discretion for the court to make 
exceptions to the six-month rule beyond those delineated in section 18-1-405(6).”). 
54. Section 18-1-405 also excludes several other additional periods of delay, such as delays 
caused by mistrials, delays caused by the defendant’s voluntary absence or unavailability, or periods in 
which the defendant is incompetent or otherwise unable to attend the trial. § 18-1-405(6). 
55. § 18-1-405(6)(b). 
56. § 18-1-405(6)(c).  
57. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); see also People v. Jompp, 440 P.3d 1166, 1172 (Colo. App. 2018) (“[The 
Statute] allows an additional delay of up to six months at the prosecution’s request, without the 
defendant’s consent, if the prosecution demonstrates that (1) evidence material to the state’s case is 
unavailable; (2) the prosecution has exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence; and (3) there exist 
reasonable grounds to believe the evidence will be available at a later date.”), cert. denied, No. 18SC718, 
2019 WL 1894699 (Colo. Apr. 29, 2019). 











without the consent of the defendant [is excluded], if: . . . [t]he 
continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional 
time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and additional time is 
justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the 
court enters specific findings with respect to the justification . . . .58 
Thus, Colorado’s speedy trial statute allows prosecutors and courts 
several “escape hatches” that allow the trial to begin more than six months 
after the defendant’s not-guilty plea, under the specific circumstances 
described above. 
C. Colorado’s Speedy Trial Window Calculation when Charges Are 
Dismissed and Later Refiled: The Restarting Approach 
Colorado follows what this Note will refer to as the restarting approach: 
Colorado’s six-month statutory speedy trial window generally restarts when 
charges are dismissed and later refiled. While the “clear language” of 
Section 18-1-405 “precludes the prosecution from reinstituting identical 
charges against” a defendant if the six-month window expired before a trial 
or dismissal,59 the same preclusion does not apply if the charges are 
dismissed before the speedy trial window expires.60 The six-month statutory 
speedy trial window must restart when the prosecution dismisses and later 
refiles the same charges, unless the defendant can affirmatively show that 
the prosecution “indiscriminately” dismissed and refiled the charges 
specifically to circumvent the speedy trial mandate.61 In contrast, for federal 
and state constitutional speedy trial purposes, Colorado does not restart the 
speedy trial period, but rather calculates it from the period of the initial filing 
 
58. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(II) (emphasis added). 
59. Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 549 (Colo. 1985) (en banc). 
60. People ex rel. C.O., 870 P.2d 1266, 1268–69 (Colo. App. 1994) (explaining that “if the 
charges in a summons and complaint are properly dismissed without prejudice, that case becomes a 
nullity, and a new speedy trial period begins if and when the accused enters a plea to subsequently filed 
charges” unless there is prosecutorial bad faith). 
61. Thus, if  
the charges of the original information are dismissed without prejudice by the trial court within 
the speedy trial period, such dismissal is sufficient to protect a defendant’s rights under § 18–
1–405. . . . An initial indictment becomes a nullity upon its dismissal and computation of the 
six-month speedy trial period commences upon the arraignment for the last information filed. 
It is true that the People cannot indiscriminately dismiss and refile charges in order to avoid the 
mandate of § 18-1-405; however, to be entitled to dismissal on such grounds, a defendant must 
affirmatively establish the existence of such a course of action by the People. 
Meehan v. Cty. Court ex rel. Cty. of Jefferson, 762 P.2d 725, 726 (Colo. App. 1988) (citations omitted); 
see also Huang v. Cty. Court of Douglas Cty., 98 P.3d 924, 928 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Allen, 885 












of charges to the dismissal plus the period after charges are refiled, without 
counting the period between the dismissal and refiling.62 
The exception to restarting the statutory speedy trial window is a 
“narrow” exception that only applies when the defendant affirmatively 
shows that the prosecution dismissed the charges to circumvent the statutory 
speedy trial mandate.63 Given how narrow this exception is, Colorado courts 
have yet to find that a defendant has met this burden, and instead routinely 
allow the speedy trial period to restart.64  
For example, a Colorado appellate court held that the defendant failed to 
show that the prosecution attempted to circumvent the speedy trial mandate 
when the prosecution refiled the charges after the defendant successfully 
moved to dismiss the initial charges due to an impending speedy trial 
violation, in a case where the prosecution’s “essential” witness was 
unavailable when only five days remained of the initial speedy trial 
window.65 Similarly, a Colorado appellate court held that the defendant did 
not meet this burden when the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the initial charges after the prosecution, during the initial speedy 
trial period, asked for a continuance due to the absence of a key witness that 
would have required setting the trial outside of the initial speedy trial period 
(but where the prosecution never actually requested a setting outside the 
speedy trial window).66 Likewise, the defendant did not meet his burden by 
offering “proof only that the district attorney sought and obtained a 
subsequent indictment for different offenses arising from the same 
transaction.”67 Further, the exception was not met where the same charges 
were dismissed and refiled four times due to “uncertainty as to the proper 
venue.”68 In sum, Colorado courts have allowed the speedy trial window to 
restart in a wide range of situations in which the prosecution could not have 
brought the case to trial within the initial speedy trial period and/or when 
the initial speedy trial period was close to expiring when the initial charges 
were dismissed. 
 
62. People v. Nelson, 360 P.3d 175, 181 (Colo. App. 2014); see also infra note 236 and 
accompanying text. 
63. People v. Walker, 252 P.3d 551, 552 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that the exception was not 
met when the court sua sponte dismissed the charges days before the expiration of the speedy trial period 
because the prosecutor’s key witness failed to appear despite the prosecutor’s diligence and where the 
defendant did not object to the dismissal). See supra note 61 for cases discussing this exception, all of 
which found that the defendant had not met this burden of showing that the prosecution dismissed and 
refiled in order to circumvent the speedy trial mandate, and so allowing the speedy trial period to restart 
for the refiled charges. 
64. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
65. Huang, 98 P.3d 924. 
66. Meehan, 762 P.2d 725. 
67. People v. Wilkinson, 555 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. App. 1976). 
68. People v. Dunhill, 570 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Colo. App. 1977). 











Finally, while a key factor in holding that the restarting exception is not 
met can be that the defendant, not the prosecution, moved to dismiss the 
initial charges,69 some Colorado courts have held that even the prosecution 
moving to dismiss the initial charges is not dispositive.70 For example, the 
exception was not met when the prosecution moved to dismiss the initial 
charges and “had been minimally negligent (if negligent at all), but had not 
acted in bad faith.”71 Thus, even when the prosecution moves to dismiss the 
initial charges and then later refiles them, Colorado courts regularly allow 
the speedy trial window to restart, finding that the defendant has not met his 
burden of showing that the prosecution dismissed the charges in order to 
circumvent the speedy trial mandate. 
In fact, this burden appears insurmountable; as of this writing, no 
published72 Colorado case has held that a defendant has met this burden of 
showing that the prosecution dismissed and refiled in order to get around 
the speedy trial period.73 Instead, as of this writing, Colorado courts have 
always allowed the speedy trial clock to restart and granted prosecutors (and 
courts) a new six-month period to bring the case to trial.74 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR CALCULATING THE SPEEDY TRIAL 
PERIOD WHEN CHARGES ARE DISMISSED AND LATER REFILED  
States with fixed statutory speedy trial periods generally follow one of 
roughly four approaches for calculating the speedy trial period when the 
 
69. Huang, 98 P.3d at 929. 
70. See Schiffner v. People, 476 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (holding that the exception did 
not apply when the state prosecutor moved to dismiss the initial charges because the defendant was being 
tried for the same crime federally and later refiled when the federal case was dropped).  
71. People v. Nelson, 360 P.3d 175, 179–80 (Colo. App. 2014). 
72. Nor has any unpublished case that I have been able to find held that a defendant has met this 
burden of showing that the prosecution dismissed and refiled in order to circumvent the speedy trial 
mandate. To try to find such cases holding that a defendant had successfully met this burden, I ran 
various Westlaw searches. More specifically, I read all of the cases returned through the following search 
in Westlaw’s Colorado database: ((dismiss! or nolle) /s (reindict! or refil!)) /100 (speedy /3 trial). I also 
filtered cases citing Section 18-1-405 with the search terms above and read these cases. Finally, I 
checked the cases that cited Meehan, Huang, Dunhill, and the other cases listed in notes 61–71. All of 
the cases returned through these searches held that the defendant had not met the burden and so the 
speedy trial period would restart; none held that the speedy trial period would not restart. 
73. The standard of review for speedy trial issues also makes it difficult for defendants to win an 
appeal of a trial court’s finding that the prosecution did not dismiss and refile in order to circumvent the 
speedy trial mandate. On appeal, speedy trial issues are “a mixed question of law and fact.” People v. 
Valles, 412 P.3d 537, 544 (Colo. App. 2013). Where the facts are undisputed, the appellate court reviews 
the application of the speedy trial statute as a question of law and reviews it de novo. Id.; see also People 
v. Curren, 348 P.3d 467, 473 (Colo. App. 2014). However, where the facts are disputed, the appellate 
court cannot “disturb the trial court’s factual findings underlying its speedy trial decision if those 
findings are supported by the record.” Valles, 412 P.3d at 544. 












prosecution dismisses and later refiles the charges.75 First, states such as 
Colorado, as discussed above, restart the statutory speedy trial period when 
charges are refiled after a previous dismissal, which this Note refers to as 
the “restarting” approach.76  
Second, in other jurisdictions, the speedy trial window does not restart 
when charges are dismissed and then refiled. Nor does dismissal toll the 
speedy trial period. Instead, the speedy trial period runs continuously from 
when the charges are first filed, regardless of any dismissals and refilings.77 
This Note will refer to this approach as the “continuous” approach. 
Third, in yet other jurisdictions, the speedy trial period begins with the 
initial charges and does not restart even for refiled charges, but the period 
is tolled during the time between dismissal and refiling.78 This Note will 
refer to this approach as the “tacking-and-tolling” approach. 
Fourth, some jurisdictions apply what this Note will refer to as a “hybrid” 
approach: the restarting approach applies when the defendant moves to 
dismiss the initial charges, but the tacking-and-tolling approach applies 
when the prosecution moves to dismiss the initial charges.79 
This Part will describe the case law in jurisdictions that follow the 
second, third, and fourth approaches as an example of alternatives to 
Colorado’s restarting approach. See Table 1 below for a summary of each 
of these approaches. 
  
 
75. See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Application of Speedy Trial Statute to Dismissal 
or Other Termination of Prior Indictment or Information and Bringing of New Indictment or 
Information, 39 A.L.R.4th 899 (1985); Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 641 (1980); Nancy Nowlin Kerr, Constitutional Law—Speedy Trial—Sixth 
Amendment Right to Speedy Trial Does Not Apply During Interim Between Dismissal of Charges and 
Subsequent Indictment by Same Sovereign, Case Note, 14 ST. MARY’S L.J. 113, 119 (1982). These works 
do not refer to these four approaches using the same names that this Note uses, but they do roughly refer 
to the same categories of approaches noted here. Derrick, supra; Joseph, supra, at 641; Kerr, supra, at 
119; see also State v. Hettle, 848 N.W.2d 582, 590 (Neb. 2014) (naming and describing the “tacking-
and-tolling approach,” without referring to the other three types of approaches). The four approaches 
noted above are the primary approaches followed by most jurisdictions with concrete statutory speedy 
trial periods, but a few states follow other approaches that will not be discussed in depth here due to 
their limited influence. See Joseph, supra, at 641 (describing a few alternate approaches, such as 
prohibiting reaccusation on the whole). 
76. See supra Part II(C). 
77. See infra Part III(A). 
78. See infra Part III(B). 
79. See infra Part III(C). 


































The speedy trial 
window for the refiled 
charges starts on 1/1/18, 
unless the defendant can 
show that the 
prosecution dismissed 
and refiled to avoid the 
speedy mandate. 
Assuming the defendant 
cannot make this 
showing, the speedy 
trial period elapses on 
7/1/18 and so, the 
refiled charges cannot 
be tried after 7/1/18. 













not restart, nor 
is it tolled. 
The speedy trial 
window for the refiled 
charges starts on 1/1/17, 
not 1/1/18. The speedy 
trial clock neither 
restarts nor is tolled 
when the initial charges 
are dismissed. Thus, the 
speedy trial window 
elapses on 7/1/17 and 
so, the charges cannot 
be tried after 7/1/17. 
Thus, the charges 
 
80. The example calculations assume that the defendant pleads not guilty to the initial charges 
on 1/1/17 and the charges are dismissed on 5/1/17. The charges are then refiled and the defendant pleads 
not guilty to the refiled charges on 1/1/18.  
Table 1 also assumes a similar statutory scheme to Colorado’s as an example, even though different 
states’ speedy trial statutes vary from Colorado’s in reality. Specifically, using Colorado’s statute only 
for example purposes, Table 1 assumes a six-month statutory window that starts (or restarts) from when 
the defendant’s not-guilty plea is entered. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405 (West 2019). Table 
1 also assumes that no other events, such as mental incompetency, etc., result in time being excluded 
from the speedy trial period’s calculation. In reality though, different states’ statutes do not always mirror 
Colorado’s statute this closely, sometimes providing for different speedy trial period lengths, starting 












refiled on 1/1/18 would 












for the refiled 






The speedy trial 
window for the refiled 
charges starts on 1/1/17, 
but is tolled in the 
period during which the 
charges are dismissed 
and not yet refiled 
between 5/1/17 to 
1/1/18. The four months 
that elapse between the 
initial charges and 
initial dismissal are 
included the speedy trial 
window for the charges 
refiled on 1/1/18. 
Therefore, on 1/1/18, 
with a speedy trial 
window of six months, 
the prosecution has only 
two months remaining 
(of the total six months) 
within which to try the 
charges, given that four 
months already elapsed 
between 1/1/17 and 
5/1/17. The speedy trial 
period elapses on 
3/1/18, and so, the 
refiled charges cannot 


















For charges dismissed 
on the defendant’s 
motion, the restarting 
approach applies, so the 
speedy trial period 
elapses on 7/1/18 and 
the refiled charges 
cannot be tried after 
7/1/18. 



















For charges dismissed 
on the government’s 
motion, the tacking-
and-tolling approach 
applies, so the speedy 
trial period elapses on 
3/1/18, and the refiled 
charges cannot be tried 
after 3/1/18. 
A. Illinois: The Continuous Approach 
Like Colorado, Illinois also has a speedy trial statute81 granting 
defendants a fixed period of time in which the trial must take place, with 
certain times excluded82 from the period. However, Illinois’s approach to 
refiled charges is unlike Colorado’s. Illinois’s speedy trial period begins 
running and is calculated for refiled charges from the time when the charges 
were first filed; the period is not tolled when the charges are dismissed, nor 
does the period restart if the charges are later refiled.83 Thus, Illinois’s 
approach to refiled charges falls into the continuous category. 
Since at least 1878, Illinois courts have held that when charges are 
dismissed and later refiled, the statutory speedy trial window continues to 
run based on the initial, not the refiled, charges.84 The 1878 Illinois Supreme 
Court went on to observe that any other approach 
would open a way for the complete evasion of the [speedy trial] 
statute, as the prosecuting officer, upon the arrival of a second or third 
 
81. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-5 (LexisNexis 2019). Unlike Colorado’s six-month 
speedy trial period, Illinois’s statute provides for a speedy trial period of 120 days from the date the 
defendant was taken into custody for defendants in custody or 160 days from the date the defendant 
demanded a trial for defendants on bail or recognizance. Id. § 5/103-5(a)–(b). 
82. The defendant must be tried within the statutory period “unless delay is occasioned by the 
defendant, by an examination for fitness . . . , by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to 
stand trial, by a continuance allowed . . . after a court’s determination of the defendant’s physical 
incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal,” or in certain circumstances when the State needs 
additional time to obtain material evidence. Id. § 5/103-5(a)–(c). 
83. People v. Lee, 254 N.E.2d 469, 471–72 (Ill. 1969) (“[R]e-indictment for the same offense 
does not toll the [speedy trial] statute.”); see also People v. E.-W. Univ., Inc., 637 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1994) (holding that the state striking the initial charges “with leave to reinstate them does not 
toll the statutory speedy trial period”); People v. Beerli, 358 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
84. Brooks v. People, 88 Ill. 327, 330 (1878) (holding that the statutory speedy trial window for 
refiled charges continues to run “as if there had been no dismissal of the first indictment,” or as if the 
refiled charges were the same as the initial (now dismissed) ones); see also Lee, 254 N.E.2d at 471–72 
(“[A]s early as [Brooks], this court held that where an original indictment is dismissed and defendant is 
re-indicted for the same offense the statutory period continues to run ‘as if there had been no dismissal 
of the first indictment’, or as if the indictment under which defendant is tried had been the first indictment 












term, would have only to enter a nolle prosequi to the indictment, 
have the defendants held in custody until another indictment could be 
found, and thus nullify the provision of the statute.85 
This logic continues today, with Illinois courts noting that “[t]he State’s 
right to reinstate [charges] subject to the speedy trial statute limits the 
State’s power to reinstate cases indefinitely.”86 
Per this statutory speedy trial mandate, Illinois courts have held that the 
prosecution cannot avoid a speedy trial violation simply by dismissing and 
later refiling the same charges.87 As a result, the speedy trial period for new 
and/or additional charges arising out of the same events as the initial 
charges, known to the State at the time of the initial charges, is subject to 
the initial charge’s speedy trial period.88 Consequently, “[t]he speedy trial 
provisions on . . . new and additional charges filed by the State . . . beg[in] 
to run as of the date of the original . . . charges” even when the original 
charges are “dismissed after the filing of the amended information.”89  
Following this principle, Illinois courts have held that a reindictment on 
the same offense in the form of a new crime is likewise still subject to the 
same statutory speedy trial window as the initial indictment, when the new 
charges arise “from the same set of facts” as the original charges and “the 
State knew of these facts at the time the initial indictment was returned.”90 
This is because “[r]e-indictment on the same offense, although in form a 
new crime, in substance continues to represent the State’s original charge 
against the defendant.”91  
Thus, Illinois follows what this Note refers to as the continuous 
approach: it calculates the statutory speedy trial period continuously starting 
from the initial charges, even for refiled charges.92 This Note will argue that 
the continuous approach is insufficiently flexible to account for the realities 
of the justice system in Part IV(C). 
 
85. Brooks, 88 Ill. at 330. 
86. People v. Rievia, 719 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that “[t]he speedy trial 
term continues to run even after a case is stricken with leave to reinstate”).  
87. People v. Howard, 563 N.E.2d 1219, 1224–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“The State cannot avoid 
a speedy trial violation by dismissing and recharging a defendant where it is clear . . . that the new . . . 
offenses charged [are] substantially the same charges as were originally filed.”). 
88. Id.; see also People v. Rodgers, 435 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (“[R]eindictment 
following dismissal of a prior indictment for the same offense is a restatement of the State’s original 
charge and an inquiry into an allegation of a speedy trial violation must consider the time which has 
elapsed since the first charge.”). 
89. Howard, 563 N.E.2d at 1224–25. 
90. People v. Parker, 375 N.E.2d 465, 467–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
91. Id. Following this same logic, “the same rule” that the statutory window is calculated from 
the first charges “applies even when the second indictment is brought in a different county where . . . the 
first county had jurisdiction to try the offense.” Rodgers, 435 N.E.2d at 965. 
92. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 











B. Nebraska: The Tacking-and-Tolling Approach 
Nebraska follows the tacking-and-tolling approach to calculate the 
speedy trial period: the speedy trial window does not restart for refiled 
charges, but it is tolled during the period between when the charges are 
dismissed and later refiled.93 
Nebraska’s speedy trial statute is similar to Colorado’s. Nebraska’s 
statute also applies a six-month speedy trial period, barring certain excluded 
periods similar to Colorado’s.94 As in Colorado, Nebraska’s statutory 
speedy trial right exists independently of the speedy trial rights found in the 
federal and state constitutions.95 The remedy is also similar: if the 
“defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as 
extended by excluded periods, he shall be entitled to his absolute discharge 
from the offense charged.”96 Finally, just as in Colorado, the burden of 
bringing the defendant to trial within the six-month period in Nebraska falls 
on the State.97 
Despite the similarities in their statutory speedy trial schemes, however, 
Nebraska and Colorado do not approach the speedy trial window calculation 
similarly for dismissed and refiled charges.98 In Nebraska, the speedy trial 
window starts when the initial information is filed, but is tolled during the 
period between the dismissal of the initial information and the refiling of an 
information charging the same crime.99 Thus, for dismissed and refiled 
charges, “the periods during which the informations are pending for the 
same offense must be combined in determining the last day for 
commencement of trial under Nebraska’s speedy trial statutes.”100 
Following this rule, an amendment to the complaint or information that 
“charges a different crime, without charging the original crime(s), . . . acts 
 
93. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.  
94. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1207 (West 2019). 
95. See State v. Karch, 639 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Neb. 2002). 
96. State v. Hutton, 648 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002). 
97. See id. 
98. Additionally, Nebraska requires a prosecutor to provide “a statement in writing, containing 
his reasons, in fact and in law, for not filing an information” to request a dismissal, and the court must 
approve the dismissal. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1606 (West 2019). The Nebraska legislature requires 
these steps for dismissal “out of an apparent fear that lazy or corrupt prosecutors were using nolle to let 
too many guilty defendants go free.” Joseph A. Thorp, Nolle-and-Reinstitution: Opening the Door to 
Regulation of Charging Powers, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 429, 450 n.98 (2016). 
99. State v. Trammell, 484 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Neb. 1992); see also State v. Batiste, 437 N.W.2d 
125, 129 (Neb. 1989) (“[T]he time between the dismissal and refiling of the charge is not includable in 
calculating the 6-month time period set forth in § 29-1207.”); State v. Dyer, 513 N.W.2d 316, 323 (Neb. 
1994) (“While time chargeable against the State under the speedy trial act commences with the filing of 
an initial information against a defendant, the time chargeable to the State ceases, or is tolled, during the 
interval between the State’s dismissal of the initial information and refiling of an information charging 
the defendant with the same crime alleged in the previous, but dismissed, information.”). 












as a dismissal,” and so the “time between the dismissal and refiling of the 
same or a similar charge is not includable in calculating the 6 month time 
period set forth in § 29-1207.”101 Building on this, Nebraska also applies its 
tacking-and-tolling approach when the State dismisses and then later files 
an information that “alleges (1) the same offense charged in the previously 
dismissed information, (2) an offense committed simultaneously with a 
lesser-included offense charged in the information previously dismissed by 
the State, or (3) commission of a crime that is a lesser-included offense of 
the crime charged in the previously dismissed information.”102 
Thus, whereas Colorado restarts the speedy trial window when charges 
are refiled, Nebraska does not restart the clock for the refiled charges. 
Rather, Nebraska continues using the speedy trial window as was started by 
the initial, not refiled, charges, and only pauses the clock for the period 
between the dismissal and refiling.103 
Nebraska courts have argued that the tacking-and-tolling approach is 
necessary to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, as the restarting 
approach—followed by Colorado—provides the prosecution with too much 
discretion.104 First, without the tacking-and-tolling approach, “whenever a 
prosecutor desired a postponement of trial beyond the 6-month period 
specified in” Nebraska’s speedy trial statute, the State “could regularly 
evade the Nebraska speedy trial act as a result of the prosecutor’s dismissing 
a charge, refiling the same charge, and acquiring a new 6-month period for 
commencement of a defendant’s trial on the refiled charge.”105 In contrast, 
the tacking-and-tolling approach does not allow the “undermining or 
subverting implementation of the speedy trial act by automatically 
providing prosecutors a new period in which to bring an accused to trial, 
irrespective of the time involved in the pendency of a prior proceeding 
dismissed by the State.”106 Therefore, to protect defendants’ statutory 
speedy trial rights against prosecutorial circumvention, Nebraska adopted 
the tacking-and-tolling approach.107 Following this line of reasoning, Parts 
IV and V of this Note will argue that Colorado should adopt the tacking-
and-tolling approach. 
 
101. State v. French, 633 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Neb. 2001). In contrast, where “the amendment to the 
complaint or information does not change the nature of the charge, then obviously the time continues to 
run against the State for purposes of the speedy trial act.” Id. 
102. State v. Sumstine, 478 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Neb. 1991). 
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
104. See Sumstine, 478 N.W.2d at 246. 
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. See id. at 245. 











C. The Federal System: The Hybrid Tacking-and-Tolling and Restarting 
Approach 
The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 uses a hybrid approach for 
calculating the speedy trial period when charges are dismissed and refiled, 
in which the tacking-and-tolling approach applies when the government 
moves to dismiss the initial charges, but the restarting approach applies 
when the defendant moves to dismiss the initial charges.108 
The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provides a concrete speedy trial 
period of seventy days, which is tolled by delays caused under several 
circumstances.109 Relevant here, delays caused by the “unavailability of . . . 
an essential witness” are excluded.110 Additionally, delays  
resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion 
or . . . at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge 
granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 
public and the defendant in a speedy trial 
are excluded.111 
In addition to excluding the periods of delay mentioned above (as well 
as a few other periods of delay not relevant here), the Speedy Trial Act of 
1974 follows a hybrid approach for calculating the speedy trial period.112 
When the indictment or information is dismissed upon the government’s 
motion, the seventy-day window is tolled in the time between when the 
charges are dismissed and then later refiled (the tacking-and-tolling 
approach).113 In contrast, when the indictment or information is dismissed 
 
108. See infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2018) (requiring that trial “commence within seventy days from the 
filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has 
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last 
occurs”). Additionally, under this statute, the trial may not begin less than thirty days from when “the 
defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se,” unless 
the defendant consents in writing. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2). This minimum thirty-day period before trial 
does not restart when charges are refiled. See United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 234–35 
(1985). 
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A). Section 3161(h) also describes several additional circumstances 
in which the speedy trial period is tolled. One notable period of time excluded is the time during which 
a motion is pending, so the seventy-day period will often not include time during which the defendant’s 
motions, such as commonly-filed motions like motions to dismiss the indictment or to suppress evidence, 
are pending. Matt Kaiser, Dismiss a Case Because of a Speedy Trial Act Violation? Not So Fast., FED. 
CRIM. APPEALS BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.federalcriminalappealsblog.com/speedy-trial-act-v 
iolation-not-so-fast/ [https://perma.cc/7WP4-HZ5S].  
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 
112. See infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 












upon the defendant’s motion, the seventy-day speedy trial window begins 
anew (the restarting approach).114 
Similar to Colorado, under the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, the 
remedy for violations of the speedy trial period is dismissal on the 
defendant’s motion.115 However, unlike Colorado, federal courts have 
discretion to dismiss the charges with or without prejudice following a 
speedy trial violation.116 The factors the court must consider in determining 
whether to dismiss the charge with or without prejudice are, “among others, 
. . . the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case 
which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the 
administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.”117 
Should a federal court allow dismissal without prejudice, the prosecution 
could then refile the charges again, barring any statute of limitations or other 
non-speedy trial issues. This Note will argue that the Federal hybrid 
approach inappropriately punishes defendants for asserting their statutory 
speedy trial rights in Part IV(D)(4).  
IV. COLORADO SHOULD FOLLOW THE TACKING-AND-TOLLING 
APPROACH 
Because of the importance of statutory speedy trial rights, Colorado 
should reconsider its current approach of restarting the speedy trial window 
when previously dismissed charges are refiled. This Part will first discuss 
the importance of speedy trial rights generally. Second, this Part will explain 
why other remedies cannot fully protect speedy trial rights, so a statutory 
speedy trial remedy is required. Finally, this Part will argue that Colorado 
should adopt the tacking-and-tolling approach because it is the most 
consistent with the Federal and Colorado Constitutions and because it best 
accounts for the realities of the judicial system while still protecting 
defendants’ speedy trial rights.118 See Table 2 at the end of this Part for a 
summary of the reasons why the tacking-and-tolling approach is superior to 
the continuous, restarting, and hybrid approaches.119 
 
114. § 3161(d)(1). 
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2018). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. The statute also provides for additional sanctions against attorneys who improperly delay 
a trial. Id. § 3162(b). 
118. See Thorp, supra note 98, at 476–78, for an argument that courts should apply a rebuttable 
presumption against dismissal and refiling that can be overcome when “the prosecutor can show that she 
could not have predicted or prevented the problem through due diligence and better investigation” and 
the state’s interest in refiling outweighs any prejudice to the defendant. Challenging dismissal and 
refiling on the whole, however, is outside the scope of this Note, which is instead focused on calculating 
the speedy trial period when charges are dismissed and refiled. Therefore, this Note will not further 
address this proposed approach. 
119. But see Part IV(C)(c) for a discussion of the drawbacks of the tacking-and-tolling approach. 











A. The Importance of Speedy Trials Generally 
The right to a speedy trial is critical to protect the rights of defendants 
for many reasons. First, a speedy trial is often necessary to a “defendant’s 
ability to present an effective defense.”120 Without a speedy trial, witnesses 
are lost, evidence decays, and memories fade.121 Second, speedy trials 
protect defendants’ interests in a timely adjudication of their guilt or 
innocence.122 Because an accusation often impacts a defendant’s reputation, 
career, finances, mental state, and family, the accused will often have an 
interest in proceeding to trial quickly.123 Thus, dismissing and later refiling 
the charges lengthens the time during which the accusation lingers over the 
defendant:  
The special anxiety that a defendant suffers because of a public 
accusation does not disappear simply because the initial charges are 
temporarily dismissed. Especially when the defendant and the public 
are aware of an ongoing government investigation of the same 
charges, the defendant’s interest in final resolution of the charges 
remains acute. After all, the government has revealed the seriousness 
of its threat of prosecution by initially bringing charges.124  
Third, a speedy trial is important because drawn-out criminal proceedings 
can drain the resources the defendant needs to effectively defend himself.125 
Thus, the right to a speedy trial is critical to defendants, both to enable them 
to present an effective defense and to protect their interests more broadly.126 
In addition to protecting defendants, the right to a speedy trial protects 
society’s more general interest in the timely adjudication of justice.127 First, 
 
120. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). 
121. Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
122. Id. at 330–31 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
123. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (“The pendency of the indictment 
may subject [the defendant] to public scorn and deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will 
force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular causes.”); United States v. 
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (holding that the Federal Constitution’s speedy trial clause of the Sixth 
Amendment is “designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the 
lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, 
and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges”). 
124. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
125. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222. 
126. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (holding that the right to a speedy trial 
is necessary “to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and 
concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the 
ability of an accused to defend himself”). 
127. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 
307, 330 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); see generally Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New 
York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 228–31 (2015) (discussing the negative 












speedy trials protect society by ensuring that those criminals who pose an 
ongoing threat are promptly imprisoned.128 Faster prosecutions prevent the 
guilty from committing additional crimes before facing trial and punishment 
for their initial crimes.129 Faster punishment will also often better deter 
criminal behavior than punishment that comes years later, if at all.130 Long 
delays “between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on 
rehabilitation.”131 Likewise, victims have an interest in timely justice.132 
Finally, an inability to bring a speedy trial tends to delegitimize the judicial 
system and rule of law by creating the perception of unfairness in the 
criminal justice system.133 Thus, society has a general interest in speedy 
trials. 
However, against defendants’ and society’s interests in speedy trials, 
courts and legislators must balance society’s equally crucial countervailing 
interest in not allowing the guilty to escape justice on a technicality.134 
Because speedy trial violations require a court to dismiss the charges with 
prejudice,135 a defendant who is tried too late can escape justice, regardless 
of the defendant’s actual guilt. Thus, though society and defendants have 
important interests in speedy trials, these protections must be carefully 
drawn so as not to allow the guilty to escape justice on technicalities rather 
than on the merits of their cases.136 
 
128. Marion, 404 U.S. at 330 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
129. Hinson v. Coulter, 723 P.2d 655, 659 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) (noting that had the defendant 
been promptly tried on his first DWI, he might not have been able to commit the three additional DWI 
offenses that followed his initial arrest), overruled by State v. Mendoza, 823 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1992) (en 
banc) (overruling Hinson’s adoption of the continuous approach for DWI cases and re-adopting the 
restarting approach). 
130. Marion, 404 U.S. at 330 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Hinson, 723 P.2d at 659. 
131. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520. 
132. Hamburg, supra note 127, at 229, 235. 
133. Id. at 230. The inability to deliver a speedy trial “produces guilty pleas or negotiated 
dispositions en masse,” which results in “other harmful externalities.” Id. Specifically, defendants begin 
to accept guilty pleas regardless of their actual guilt or innocence in the face of the justice “system’s 
slow grind.” Id. at 231. Additionally, as defendants take pleas instead of going to trial, the “criminal 
justice system loses an important check on the police because the quality of their work is rarely tested 
in open court.” Id. at 230. 
134. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (“The right of a speedy trial is necessarily 
relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It 
does not preclude the rights of public justice.”). 
135. In Colorado, dismissal with prejudice is required for statutory speedy trial violations. COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405 (West 2019); see also People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Colo. 1987) 
(en banc). This same rule—that speedy trial violations must result in dismissal—also applies to Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial violations. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439–40 (1973). However, 
the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 is an exception to the general trend prohibiting refiling charges 
following a speedy trial violation, as the Federal Speedy Trial Act grants judges discretion to dismiss 
the charges with or without prejudice following a violation. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
136. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized this concern in People v. Sanchez, where the court 
noted that the purposes of speedy trial rights 
include minimization of the anxiety and concern resulting to a defendant from public 
accusation, and the prevention of prejudice to the accused arising from long delays. The more 











B. Speedy Trial Statutes Compared with Other Remedies 
Speedy trial statutes are uniquely designed to protect the above interests; 
other legal remedies will not fully ensure that defendants face trial in a 
timely manner while striking the appropriate balance with society’s interests 
in not allowing the guilty to escape justice on a technicality. This Section 
will address the other remedies that serve to partially protect speedy trials: 
criminal statutes of limitations, the Due Process Clauses, the Sixth 
Amendment, and the Colorado Constitution. This Section will then explain 
why each of these remedies alone, as interpreted by courts, does not fully 
protect speedy trial rights. 
Statutes of limitation are “usually considered the primary guarantee 
against bringing overly stale criminal charges.”137 They indirectly protect 
speedy trial rights when charges are dismissed, because the statute of 
limitations prevents the prosecution from delaying in refiling past the end 
of the specified period. However, although they provide indirect 
protections, statutes of limitations cannot protect speedy trial rights fully 
“because they do not purport to account for prejudice, bad faith, or 
fairness.”138 Thus, statutes of limitations alone only partially and indirectly 
protect speedy trial rights when charges are dismissed and refiled. 
Additionally, while Colorado has statute of limitations periods of 
varying length for most crimes, the state has no statute of limitations for the 
most serious crimes.139 And Colorado’s statute of limitations exceeds six 
months for everything except petty crimes.140 Thus, as Colorado has no 
statute of limitations for serious crimes, no statute of limitations acts to 
indirectly protect speedy trial rights for the most serious of crimes. And, 
even for crimes for which Colorado has a statute of limitations, that statute 
of limitations extends for a longer period than the six months provided for 
by Colorado’s speedy trial statute for all but petty crimes.141 Thus, 
Colorado’s statute of limitations cannot force a speedy trial within six 
months, but can only indirectly protect this right by preventing prosecutors 
from delaying too long in refiling charges for crimes that have a statute of 
 
general public interest is also served by an early determination of guilt “so that the innocent 
may be exonerated and the guilty punished.” 
649 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (citation omitted) (quoting Jaramillo v. Dist. Court, 484 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Colo. 1971) (en banc)). However, “speedy trial provisions are not intended to be 
applied in a wooden or mechanistic fashion” because “[t]here is also a countervailing interest in effective 
enforcement of the criminal laws.” Id. 
137. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966). 
138. Thorp, supra note 98, at 457. 
139. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-401(1)(a) (West 2019). 
140. Id. 












limitations period. For this reason, Colorado’s statute of limitations alone 
does not fully protect speedy trial rights. 
Likewise, federal and Colorado courts’ interpretations of the 
constitutional speedy trial rights found in the Due Process Clauses and the 
Sixth Amendment mean that these constitutional protections will not wholly 
guarantee speedy trials.142 First, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
protects speedy trial rights only in limited circumstances.143 To prevail on 
an oppressive delay claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, the defendant must prove actual, substantial prejudice and 
prosecutorial bad faith in delaying the trial.144 However, defendants will 
rarely be able to meet either of these burdens.145 First, “because of the very 
nature of delay, . . . the passage of time often makes it impossible to prove” 
the requisite actual, substantial (not just potential) prejudice.146 Second, by 
focusing narrowly on actual, substantial prejudice, the Due Process Clause 
does not protect against other harms from dismissal and refiling, such as 
prolonged “anxiety and concern, loss of counsel of choice, and coercion of 
guilty pleas.”147 Finally, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
requires a showing of prosecutorial bad faith in delaying, similar to 
Colorado’s existing restarting exception.148 It is very difficult for defendants 
to show such prosecutorial bad faith, especially given that prosecutors are 
rarely “foolish enough” to record evidence of their bad faith.149 Thus, the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as interpreted by courts, protects 
speedy trial rights only in cases where the defendant can prove both actual 
prejudice and prosecutorial misconduct, so it does not protect speedy trial 
rights in all cases. 
Likewise, the Federal Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
the Colorado Constitution’s Due Process Clause150 offer limited 
protections.151 These Due Process Clauses protect against repeated 
dismissals and refilings of the same charges—albeit in a small number of 
cases.152 However, these Due Process Clauses do not address the speedy 
 
142. Thorp, supra note 98, at 459–61. 
143. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 20 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause does not wholly protect speedy trial rights 
because it does not protect against prosecutorial negligence); see also Thorp, supra note 98, at 459–61. 
144. United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 465 (10th Cir. 2006); see also supra notes 
9–11 and accompanying text. 
145. See DuBosar, supra note 11, at 685. 
146. Thorp, supra note 98, at 460. 
147. Id. 
148. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
149. Thorp, supra note 98, at 460; see also supra Part II(C) for a discussion of the difficulties of 
proving prosecutorial bad faith with respect to Colorado’s speedy trial statute. 
150. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25. 
151. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 











trial issue directly, especially in circumstances where the case is only 
dismissed then refiled one time (not repeatedly). 
The United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial 
protections, as interpreted by the courts, are similarly limited. First, the 
Sixth Amendment does not prevent dismissal and refiling, as it does not 
count the period between when the prosecution drops the initial charges and 
when it refiles them in calculating the speedy trial period.153 Moreover, 
under Barker, “[i]t is . . . impossible to determine with precision when the 
right [to a speedy trial] has been denied.”154 In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court has noted that it cannot establish a definitive Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial timeframe due to separation of powers concerns, 
as setting a concrete timeframe  
would require this Court to engage in legislative or rulemaking 
activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which we should 
confine our efforts. . . . We find no constitutional basis for holding 
that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number 
of days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a 
reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our 
approach must be less precise.155 
In following this intentionally vague Sixth Amendment speedy trial test, 
“the Court has been hesitant to find violations of the speedy trial right or 
provide broad protection for criminal defendants.”156 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Federal Constitution have provided for an 
intentionally vague speedy trial standard that offers only limited protections 
in cases where charges are dismissed and later refiled. 
Finally, as previously mentioned, Colorado courts largely interpret the 
state constitution’s speedy trial provision as following the Federal 
Constitution’s, and so the Colorado Constitution does not provide additional 
speedy trial protections to Colorado defendants.157 Therefore, because both 
state and federal constitutional speedy trial protections, as interpreted, are 
vague and circumscribed by separation of powers concerns, state statutes 
can fill the gaps. Speedy trial statutes can go further than the constitutions 
in providing definite and concrete speedy trial periods to ensure that trials 
take place in a timely manner. 
 
153. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982). 
154. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).  
155. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
156. Hamburg, supra note 127, at 237; see also Alfredo Garcia, Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-
Fledged Right or “Second-Class Citizen?,” 21 SW. U. L. REV. 31, 60 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court “has failed to develop a consistent, principled approach protective of defendants’ speedy trial 
interests”). 












However, the extent to which such speedy trial statutes protect speedy 
trial rights when charges are dismissed and refiled depends on how the 
speedy trial period is calculated. The benefits and drawbacks of each of the 
approaches for calculating the speedy trial period will be discussed in Parts 
IV(C) and IV(D) below. 
C. The Continuous Approach Is Too Harsh 
1. The Continuous Approach Is Too Inflexible to Account for the 
Realities of the Justice System 
The continuous approach, which calculates the speedy trial period 
starting from the initial charges even when those charges are dismissed and 
then refiled much later,158 is not sufficiently flexible to account for the 
realities of the justice system. Because charges must be dismissed when the 
trial falls outside the statutory speedy trial period, harsher statutory speedy 
trial period calculations will more frequently allow the guilty to escape 
justice, not because of their innocence, but because of technical speedy trial 
statutory violations.159 
By applying a categorical rule that the judicial system only gets six 
months160 from when charges are first filed,161 the continuous approach does 
not sufficiently recognize that there are instances in which the prosecution 
should be able to refile previously dismissed charges. A statutory speedy 
trial mandate using the continuous approach will usually bar the prosecution 
from dismissing and refiling the charges (because time has run out), even 
when it has a truly valid reason for doing so.162 For example, suppose the 
prosecution files charges and an essential witness falls into a coma during 
 
158. See supra Part III(A). 
159. This concern also applies to constitutional speedy trial violations, which also carry  
the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the [Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial] right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means 
that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. 
Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is 
the only possible remedy. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted). 
160. For the purposes of clarity, I use six months as the length of time statutorily provided during 
which the prosecution and courts must bring the case to trial, but some states with speedy trial statutes 
provide a different fixed length of time other than six months. 
161. This example assumes that nothing else tolls the statutory speedy trial period, such as the 
“period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial,” the “period of delay caused by an 
interlocutory appeal,” or any of the other time periods excluded from the six-month speedy trial period 
by statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405(6) (West 2019).  
162. While the continuous approach does not bar dismissal and refiling outright, it will usually 
prevent dismissal and refiling because refiling the charges is barred more than six months (or whatever 
the statutory period is in that state) from the initial filing. 











this time, and so the prosecution must dismiss the charges.163 Once the 
witness awakens, the prosecution should be able to then refile the charges 
in this situation.164 However, if the witness awoke more than six months 
from the initial filing, the continuous approach would bar the prosecution 
from refiling the case. As another example, the prosecution may often have 
good reasons for dismissing and refiling charges, such as the discovery of 
new evidence.165 However, once the period has run under the continuous 
approach, the prosecution is barred from refiling, even in cases where it has 
good reason to do so. Thus, the continuous approach would unjustifiably 
reward some defendants by requiring the dismissal of their cases due to 
technical speedy trial violations, even where they might be guilty.166  
Additionally, the continuous approach incentivizes prosecutors to 
proceed even when they should dismiss the charges (for example, because 
the key witness is in a coma).167 In these situations, prosecutors may refuse 
to dismiss the charges because they know that doing so under the continuous 
approach means they will likely be barred from refiling the charges due to 
violations of a speedy trial statute.168  
2. The Continuous Approach Failed in Arizona 
Because of the continuous approach’s inflexibility, Arizona abandoned 
the continuous approach in favor of the restarting approach, finding the 
continuous approach too prone to abuses.  
Arizona currently follows the restarting approach, similar to Colorado, 
allowing the statutory speedy trial period to restart for charges that were 
dismissed without prejudice and later refiled, “absent a showing of” 
prosecutorial “bad faith . . . or prejudice to the accused.”169 However, in 
1986, in Hinson v. Coulter,170 the Arizona Supreme Court departed from the 
restarting approach and instead decided to follow the continuous approach 
for calculating the statutory speedy trial period for driving while intoxicated 
 
163. Thorp, supra note 98, at 438. 
164. Id. 
165. See, e.g., State v. Bonarrigo, 402 N.E.2d 530, 534–35 (Ohio 1980). 
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
168. Id.; see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 11 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(noting that “the interest in allowing the Government to proceed cautiously and deliberately before 
making a final decision to prosecute” means that the prosecution should sometimes be able to dismiss 
and refile charges). 
169. State v. Rose, 589 P.2d 5, 11 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc); see also Godoy v. Hantman, 67 P.3d 
700, 702 (Ariz. 2003) (“[T]ime limits for purposes of the right to a speedy trial begin to run anew when 
a grand jury reindicts a defendant following the dismissal of an earlier action against the defendant.”). 
170. 723 P.2d 655 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc), overruled by State v. Mendoza, 823 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 












(DWI) and driving under the influence (DUI) cases.171 The court held that 
preventing the statutory speedy trial window from restarting was necessary 
because the evidence in DWI172 cases is “often fleeting.”173 Moreover, 
dropping DWI charges led defendants to believe they did not need to make 
efforts to preserve evidence, which created problems for those defendants 
when the DWI charges were later refiled.174 Additionally, the court held that 
the continuous approach best followed the legislature’s “clear intention” of 
removing drunk drivers from the roads by prosecuting them in a timely 
fashion.175 
However, less than six years later, the Arizona Supreme Court overruled 
Hinson, reverting to the restarting approach and holding that the continuous 
approach had proven unworkable in practice.176 The court noted that 
“numerous DUI177 defendants have avoided trial or conviction, not on the 
merits, but because of” Hinson’s continuous approach.178 Rather than 
accelerating the prosecution of drunk drivers, the continuous approach 
delayed their prosecution due to the need to litigate Hinson issues related to 
calculating the speedy trial period under the continuous approach.179 Hinson 
clogged the court system, creating an “avalanche of cases” and producing 
“a whole new subspecies of DUI litigation” in which DUI cases were 
litigated based on Hinson speedy trial violation issues, instead of “the merits 
of the case.”180 DUI cases under Hinson had become “time games, with 
defendants escaping conviction not because of the merits of their defenses, 
but because of fortuitous circumstances” of too-slow prosecutions under the 
continuous approach.181  
Additionally, the Mendoza court found that the Hinson rule did not give 
prosecutors and courts enough flexibility. While defendants were allowed 
to delay as much as needed because their continuances were excluded from 
speedy trial calculations under Hinson, the court and prosecution’s delays 
 
171. See Hinson, 723 P.2d at 660. 
172. In its reasoning for applying the continuous rule to drunk driving cases, the Hinson court 
explicitly referred to only DWI cases, but appears to also implicitly include DUI cases in its rationale as 
well. See id. at 658–60. 
173. Id. at 658. 
174. Id. at 658–59. 
175. Id. at 659–60. 
176. State v. Mendoza, 823 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc). The Mendoza court never discussed 
the tacking-and-tolling approach, but only the continuous and restarting approaches. See id.  
177. The Mendoza court explicitly referred to DUI cases only, but appears to also implicitly 
include DWI cases as well. See id. at 55–59. 
178. Id. at 55. 
179. Id. at 56. 
180. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 783 P.2d 241, 244–45 (Ariz. 1989) (en 
banc) (Moeller, J., specially concurring)). 
181. Id. at 57. 











were included in the speedy trial period under Hinson.182 Because of this 
discrepancy, the Hinson rule did “not allow the necessary flexibility to grant 
a continuance when the trial judge” or prosecutor was needed “at another 
trial or when a key witness ha[d] been injured.”183 Additionally, the court 
held that establishing the continuous approach had been an improper reach 
of the court into the legislative arena, as the court does not have the 
“prerogative to redefine the application of our own Rules of Criminal 
Procedure differently from the plain language of the rules.”184 In sum, 
Hinson’s continuous approach did “not br[ing] speedy trials,” but rather 
occasionally “resulted in unwarranted dismissals of charges and 
undoubtedly . . . spawned a great deal of collateral litigation.”185 Thus, the 
continuous approach proved unworkable in practice in Arizona. 
3. The Tacking-and-Tolling Approach Is More Flexible than the 
Continuous Approach, Although Still Harsher than the Restarting 
Approach 
The tacking-and-tolling approach is more flexible than the continuous 
approach. The continuous approach starts the speedy trial period when the 
initial charges are filed and does not toll the speedy trial when the initial 
charges are dismissed. Thus, under the continuous approach, assuming a 
six-month statutory period, the prosecution only has the six months from 
when the initial charges are filed to bring the case to trial, even if the charges 
are later dismissed and refiled.186 In contrast, the tacking-and-tolling 
approach tolls the speedy trial clock in the period between when the charges 
are dismissed and when they are later refiled. Thus, under the tacking-and-
tolling approach, a prosecutor can dismiss the initial charges and then still 
refile the charges at a later point, even if more than six months have passed 
from when the initial charges were filed.187 Thus, the tacking-and-tolling 
approach is more flexible than the continuous approach because it will 
generally allow prosecutors to refile charges for a longer period of time, and 
so will less often allow the guilty to escape on a speedy trial technicality. 
However, while the tacking-and-tolling approach is more flexible than 
the continuous approach, the restarting approach allows even more 
flexibility than both the tacking-and-tolling and continuous approaches. 
Both the restarting and tacking-and-tolling approaches generally allow the 
 
182. Id. at 56–57. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 59. 
185. Id. at 62 (Feldman, Vice C.J., specially concurring). 
186. See Table 1 for an example of this calculation. 
187. This example calculation assumes that the entire statutory six-month period had not run 












prosecution to refile charges, even when more than six months have passed 
since the initial charges were filed.188 The restarting approach, though, 
allows the prosecution a full, new six-month period for the refiled charges, 
whereas the tacking-and-tolling approach only provides the prosecution 
whatever time remained on the speedy trial clock when the initial charges 
were dismissed. In sum, while both the restarting and tacking-and-tolling 
approaches generally allow for refiling charges even when more than six 
months have passed from when the initial charges were filed, the restarting 
approach offers the prosecution the longest time period in which to bring 
the refiled charges to trial. 
Nevertheless, the increase in flexibility offered by the restarting 
approach over the tacking-and-tolling approach does not outweigh the 
tacking-and-tolling approach’s other benefits. The next Section will explain 
why the tacking-and-tolling approach offers greater benefits than the 
restarting approach. 
D. The Tacking-and-Tolling Approach Protects Speedy Trial Rights Better 
than the Restarting Approach 
Colorado courts have already noted that “speedy trial provisions are not 
intended to be applied in a wooden or mechanistic fashion” due to the 
“countervailing interest in effective enforcement of the criminal laws.”189 In 
the case of dismissed and refiled charges, the tacking-and-tolling approach 
better protects the countervailing interests of protecting speedy trials while 
also ensuring that the guilty face punishment than does Colorado’s current 
approach of restarting the period. 
For this reason, the Ohio Supreme Court, which also has a speedy trial 
statute,190 noted that the tacking-and-tolling approach best aligned with the 
legislature’s intent in adopting a statute providing a concrete speedy trial 
period.191 The Ohio Supreme Court found that the tacking-and-tolling 
approach best balances defendants’ speedy trial rights with the public 
interest in convicting criminals: 
It was not the General Assembly’s sole purpose in enacting the 
speedy trial statutes to reward those accused of criminal conduct for 
a prosecutor’s lack of diligence. Concededly, an accused has a valid 
interest in, and an independent constitutional right to, a speedy trial. 
 
188. See Table 1 for an example of this calculation for the restarting approach and the tacking-
and-tolling approach. Again, this assumes that the entire statutory six-month period had not run before 
the initial charges were dismissed. 
189. People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Colo. 1982) (en banc). 
190. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.71 (West 2019).  
191. State v. Bonarrigo, 402 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ohio 1980). 











However, in construing the speedy trial statutes, this court also 
recognizes the public’s interests not only in the prompt adjudication 
of criminal cases, but also in obtaining convictions of persons who 
have committed criminal offenses against the state.192 
Applying this logic, the Ohio Supreme Court correctly decided to follow 
the tacking-and-tolling approach, noting that it adequately protects 
defendants’ statutory speedy trial rights.193 Colorado should apply the same 
logic to its speedy trial statute and likewise adopt the tacking-and-tolling 
approach to best protect defendants’ speedy trial rights while also allowing 
for the effective prosecution of criminals. 
1. Colorado’s Restarting Approach’s Speedy Trial Loophole Is 
Oversized Compared to Tacking-and-Tolling’s Narrower Loophole 
for Trials Outside the Six-Month Window 
This Section will contrast the length of time usually granted to 
prosecutors and courts to bring cases to trial under the restarting and 
tacking-and-tolling approaches when charges are dismissed and refiled. 
First, this Section will explain that Colorado courts currently regularly 
restart the six-month speedy trial period under the restarting approach when 
charges are dismissed and refiled, in effect granting prosecutors at least two 
six-month periods, instead of just the one six-month period provided by 
statute. This Section will then argue that the regular granting of an 
additional six-month period (on top of the one statutorily-provided six-
month period) when charges are dismissed and refiled is too large a loophole 
to Colorado’s speedy trial statute. Next, this Section will argue that 
Colorado could narrow this loophole by adopting the tacking-and-tolling 
approach, which grants prosecutors less time when charges are dismissed 
and refiled than the restarting approach. Finally, this Section will explain 
that adopting a narrower speedy trial calculation approach would not unduly 
hamstring courts and prosecutors because Colorado’s speedy trial statute 
already provides courts and prosecutors several other escape hatches from 
the speedy trial period. 
Colorado’s restarting approach has an exception if the defendant can 
affirmatively demonstrate that the prosecution dismissed and refiled the 
charges in order to avoid the speedy trial mandate.194 However, such a 
showing—that circumventing a speedy trial “was the true motive behind the 
dismissal”—is “difficult to make.”195  
 
192. Id. 
193. Id.  
194. See supra Part II(C). 












This difficulty for defendants to prove the prosecution’s motives has 
played out in the application of this exception in Colorado. Colorado courts 
have yet to find that a defendant has met his burden of affirmatively showing 
that the prosecution dismissed and refiled charges in order to circumvent 
the speedy trial statute.196 Because courts have been so hesitant to find this 
exception satisfied, Colorado’s current approach leaves prosecutors with 
too much discretion to restart the speedy trial window. Under Colorado’s 
current restarting approach, the prosecution is free to “regularly evade” the 
speedy trial statute “as a result of the prosecutor’s dismissing a charge, 
refiling the same charge, and acquiring a new [six]-month period for 
commencement of a defendant’s trial on the refiled charge.”197 At its worst, 
this approach allows “the prosecutor to grant herself an unauthorized 
continuance,” impinging on the impartial court’s decision-making 
authority.198 Thus, in practice, Colorado’s approach has created too large a 
loophole for prosecutorial evasion of the statutory speedy trial mandate, 
regularly allowing prosecutors not one, but at least two, six-month speedy 
trial periods when charges are dismissed and later refiled. 
Finally, because Colorado’s exception only applies upon a showing that 
the prosecution dismissed and refiled the charges to circumvent the speedy 
trial mandate,199 the exception does not adequately account for cases where 
prosecutorial negligence caused the dismissal and refiling. However, “[a] 
negligent failure by the government to ensure [a] speedy trial is virtually as 
damaging to the interests protected by the right as an intentional failure.”200 
Hence, Colorado’s current approach creates too large a loophole that allows 
prosecutorial negligence to circumvent the speedy trial statutory period. 
While the tacking-and-tolling approach still allows for dismissal and 
refiling,201 this approach significantly limits the extent to which such 
dismissal and refiling benefits the prosecution. Because the speedy trial 
window does not restart under the tacking-and-tolling approach, prosecutors 
only receive the amount of time that remained on the speedy trial clock 
when the initial charges were dismissed, not a whole, new six-month period 
after refiling.202 Thus, the tacking-and-tolling approach is necessary to 
“prevent undermining or subverting implementation of the speedy trial act 
 
196. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The extreme difficulty in proving prosecutorial 
bad faith in dismissing and refiling charges can also be seen in the difficulties that defendants have in 
showing bad faith in the context of Federal Due Process Clause cases regarding dismissal and refiling. 
Kerr, supra note 75, at 125. 
197. State v. Sumstine, 478 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Neb. 1991). 
198. Thorp, supra note 98, at 440. 
199. See supra Part II(C). 
200. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 334 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Dickey 
v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 51–52 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
201. See supra Part III(B). 
202. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 











by automatically providing prosecutors a new period in which to bring an 
accused to trial, irrespective of the time involved in the pendency of a prior 
proceeding dismissed by the State.”203 Thus, while the tacking-and-tolling 
approach still allows prosecutors and courts some flexibility, it offers a 
much narrower loophole around the statutory speedy trial period. 
Finally, Colorado could narrow its current speedy trial calculation from 
the restarting to the tacking-and-tolling approach without overly narrowing 
prosecutors’ and courts’ discretion, because Colorado’s speedy trial statute 
already provides prosecutors and courts several escape hatches (regardless 
of approach).204 For example, Section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) gives prosecutors 
an additional delay of six months, on top of the six-month speedy trial 
period, when “the prosecution demonstrates that (1) evidence material to 
the state’s case is unavailable; (2) the prosecution has exercised due 
diligence to obtain the evidence; and (3) there exist reasonable grounds to 
believe the evidence will be available at a later date.”205 Thus, Colorado’s 
speedy trial statute already provides prosecutors additional time when 
evidence is unavailable, which would somewhat soften the tacking-and-
tolling approach’s harshness in calculating the speedy trial clock. As 
another example, Section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II) allows courts to grant 
prosecutors up to six additional months, without the defendant’s consent, 
over and above the six-month speedy trial period under exceptional 
circumstances.206 Thus, Section 18-1-405(6)(g) provides courts and 
prosecutors several escape hatches through which they can receive 
additional time on top of the six-month speedy trial period. And because 
Colorado’s speedy trial statute already provides these escape hatches, 
Colorado need not retain its current restarting approach which regularly 
provides prosecutors and courts another avenue to obtain more than six 
months to bring cases to trial. Colorado could adopt the narrower tacking-
and-tolling approach—which gives prosecutors and courts less flexibility 
than the restarting approach when charges are dismissed and refiled—
because Colorado’s speedy trial statute already allows prosecutors and 





203. State v. Sumstine, 478 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Neb. 1991). 
204. See supra Part II(B). 
205. People v. Jompp, 440 P.3d 1166, 1172 (Colo. App. 2018) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) (West 2019)), cert. denied, No. 18SC718, 2019 WL 1894699 (Colo. Apr. 29, 2019); 
see also supra note 57 and accompanying text. Section 18-1-405(6) also describes several other 
circumstances that toll the speedy trial clock, none of which are relevant here. 












2. The Tacking-and-Tolling Approach Promotes Efficiency in the 
Justice System 
The tacking-and-tolling approach best promotes efficiency in the justice 
system for prosecutors, courts, and defendants themselves.207 First, by 
including the time between the initial charges and their dismissal, the 
tacking-and-tolling approach incentivizes prosecutors to approach dismissal 
with due caution, while still allowing them to dismiss and refile when 
appropriate.208 Because prosecutors know they will not get the full six-
month statutory period when they refile the charges, they will be more 
careful to dismiss charges only when they cannot proceed on the initial 
charges due to a valid reason. Prosecutors will therefore be more hesitant to 
dismiss and refile. 
Second, tacking-and-tolling promotes judicial efficiency. Because 
tacking-and-tolling makes prosecutors less likely to dismiss and refile 
charges, these benefits spill over into the court system. The court will less 
often need to reacquaint itself with previously dismissed cases. 
Additionally, Colorado’s current restarting approach requires the court to 
make a fact-specific inquiry into the prosecution’s motives for dismissing 
and refiling the charges, as prosecutorial efforts to evade the speedy trial 
mandate prevent the window from restarting.209 Colorado’s restarting 
approach requires courts to determine whether the dismissal was supported 
by a valid rationale that allows restarting the speedy trial clock, or whether 
it was a prosecutorial maneuver to avoid the speedy mandate.210 Requiring 
the defendant to try to prove bad faith, the prosecution to try to defend its 
motives, and the court to then determine said motives impairs judicial 
efficiency by burdening the court with making a fact-specific determination 
every time a defendant challenges the refiling of previously dismissed 
charges.  
In contrast, the tacking-and-tolling approach avoids this difficult and 
subjective inquiry.211 Whereas the restarting approach requires courts to 
 
207. See Thorp, supra note 98, for a detailed discussion of the harms of dismissal and refiling on 
the justice system. 
208. Kerr, supra note 75, at 125. 
209. See supra Part II(C). 
210. See supra Part II(C). 
211. However, this lack of subjective inquiry also presents a difficulty to the tacking-and-tolling 
approach, by not accounting for the prosecution’s potential good faith. The tacking-and-tolling approach 
does not allow the prosecution additional time, even when the prosecution has a valid reason for 
dismissing and later refiling, such as a subsequent discovery of new evidence. However, tacking-and-
tolling’s good faith issue is mitigated in two ways. First, the prosecution still has whatever time remained 
of the speedy trial window when the initial charges were dismissed, and so will usually be able to refile 
the charges, even when more than six months have passed since the initial charges were filed. See supra 
Part IV(C)(c). Second, Colorado’s speedy trial statute already provides a few escape hatches for 











make a fact-specific inquiry into a prosecutor’s motives, the tacking-and-
tolling approach requires no such inquiry into the prosecutor’s good or bad 
faith. Instead, the tacking-and-tolling approach is a purely objective 
standard applied in all cases in which charges are dismissed and refiled 
regardless of the prosecution’s motives.212 By avoiding a subjective inquiry 
into motives, the tacking-and-tolling approach is easier for courts to apply. 
And so, the tacking-and-tolling approach increases judicial efficiency.  
Third, because tacking-and-tolling decreases the number of needlessly 
dismissed and refiled cases, it allows defendants to be most efficient with 
their resources. Defendants who pay for their own defense spend significant 
resources during the initial charges,213 but if the charges are dismissed and 
later refiled, the defendant will need to rehire their original counsel or hire 
new counsel. Then this rehired or new counsel will need to spend significant 
resources learning (or relearning) the case and deciding whether to 
challenge the prosecution’s motive for dismissal. Thus, dismissing and 
refiling increases costs on defendants who need these resources to mount an 
effective defense. A similar point can be made for defendants who use 
public defenders, who will likewise need to spend time learning or 
relearning the case when charges are refiled after a previous dismissal.  
In sum, the tacking-and tolling approach promotes efficiency in the 
justice system. First, it encourages prosecutors to approach dismissing-and-
refiling with due caution, while still allowing such action when necessary. 
Second, it is more efficient for courts, because it is an objective rule easy 
for courts to apply, rather than requiring a subjective, fact-specific inquiry 
into the prosecution’s motives. Third, by decreasing the number of cases 
dismissed and refiled, tacking-and-tolling allows defendants (and public 
defenders) to be efficient in defending cases once, instead of twice. 
3. Colorado’s Restarting Approach Is Too Vague Whereas the 
Tacking-and-Tolling Approach Provides Clarity 
Colorado’s current restarting approach is too vague about when the 
speedy trial window will restart and when it will not due to prosecutorial 
attempts to circumvent the speedy trial mandate.214 Colorado courts have 
 
prosecutors, such as in cases of the unavailability of evidence or exceptional circumstances, that allow 
prosecutors more time when warranted. See supra Part II(B). 
212. See supra Part III(B). 
213. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (noting that a long delay before trial may 
“impair the ability of an accused to defend himself”). 
214. See Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further Is the Furtherance of Justice?, 
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 455–68 (1989), for a discussion of the vagueness problem in other states 
and the federal system’s dismissal and refiling speedy trial window calculations and an argument for 












yet to hold that a prosecutor dismissed and refiled in order to circumvent 
the speedy trial mandate, and so there is little guidance yet on what 
constitutes an invalid reason for dismissal and refiling.215 Thus, under the 
current approach, it is unclear to courts, prosecutors, and defendants what 
constitutes a valid reason for dismissal and what constitutes impermissible 
circumvention of the speedy trial mandate. 
By contrast, the tacking-and-tolling approach does not require an inquiry 
into the prosecution’s motives, but rather simply tolls the period after 
dismissal automatically.216 Thus, the tacking-and-tolling approach does not 
require the application of any vague standards to the prosecution’s motives 
for the dismissal and refiling of the charges. 
Moreover, while the tacking-and-tolling approach does not include a 
good faith element, Colorado defendants would still be protected against 
prosecutorial bad faith through the Federal and Colorado Constitutions’ Due 
Process Clauses, even should Colorado adopt the tacking-and-tolling 
approach.217 When the prosecution repeatedly dismisses and refiles charges 
in bad faith, such an action violates both the Colorado and Federal 
Constitutions’ Due Process Clauses and is not allowed.218 Thus, a good faith 
requirement is not needed as part of the speedy trial calculations under 
tacking-and-tolling’s objective approach, because the Due Process Clauses 
protect against bad faith separately from the speedy trial statutory 
calculation. 
4. Colorado’s Restarting Approach and the Federal Hybrid Approach 
Both Penalize Defendants Who Assert Their Statutory Speedy Trial 
Rights 
As discussed, under current Colorado law, the speedy trial period will 
restart unless the defendant can prove prosecutorial bad faith in dismissing 
and refiling the charges.219 While not dispositive, several Colorado courts 
have held that the defendant, not the prosecution, moving to dismiss the 
initial charges can be a factor in finding that there was not prosecutorial bad 
faith when the court dismissed the initial charges due to an imminent speedy 
trial violation.220 Thus, Colorado courts indirectly penalize defendants who 
 
215. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra Part III(B). Other tacking-and-tolling approach states are more explicit in holding 
that prosecutorial motives are immaterial under this approach. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 650 S.W.2d 818, 
820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc). 
217. See supra Part I. 
218. See People v. Abrahamsen, 489 P.2d 206, 209 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); see also supra Part I.  
219. See supra Part II(C). 
220. Huang v. Cty. Court of Douglas Cty., 98 P.3d 924, 929 (Colo. App. 2004); see also Meehan 
v. Cty. Court ex rel. Cty. of Jefferson, 762 P.2d 725 (Colo. App. 1988). 











move to dismiss the initial charges by asserting their statutory speedy trial 
rights in the face of an impending speedy trial violation. 
While Colorado implicitly penalizes defendants who move to dismiss the 
initial charges, the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974221 explicitly penalizes 
defendants who assert their statutory rights. The federal system applies the 
restarting approach when the indictment or information is dismissed on the 
defendant’s motion, but follows the tacking-and-tolling approach when 
charges are dismissed on the government’s motion.222 Consequently, 
defendants are penalized for moving to dismiss charges, while the 
prosecution is not, under the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974. 
Thus, both Colorado’s restarting approach and the federal system’s 
hybrid approach penalize defendants for asserting their statutory rights. For 
example, under the restarting and hybrid approaches, a defendant in either 
the Colorado or federal courts faces a difficult choice when the prosecution 
cannot possibly bring the case to trial within the speedy trial period, but the 
speedy trial violation has yet to actually occur: If the defendant moves to 
dismiss based on the impending speedy trial violation, she opens the door 
for the prosecution to be able to refile the charges with a restarted speedy 
trial window. However, if the defendant chooses to strategically wait for the 
impending speedy trial violation to actually occur in order to prevent the 
speedy trial window from restarting, she is forced to endure further time 
under the threat of prosecution and spend further resources defending 
herself.223 Moreover, such waiting further clogs the court’s calendar instead 
of removing a trial that will certainly not occur within the speedy trial 
period. 
In contrast, under the tacking-and-tolling approach, the speedy trial clock 
is tolled as soon as the initial charges are dismissed.224 For this reason, 
prosecutors are incentivized to dismiss the charges as soon as they know 
that they will not be able to bring the case to trial within the speedy trial 
window. Moreover, under the tacking-and-tolling approach, defendants are 
free to move for dismissal when a speedy trial violation is inevitably 
looming, instead of being forced to sweat out the speedy trial clock or risk 
punishment in the form of a renewed speedy trial window. 
 
221. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2018). 
222. See supra Part III(C). 
223. See supra notes 120–126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the burdens that delayed 
trials place on defendants.  












5. Colorado’s Restarting Approach Infringes on the Courts’ Powers 
By allowing the speedy trial window to restart upon the refiling of 
charges, the restarting approach essentially allows prosecutors the ability to 
grant themselves an unauthorized continuance, because a prosecutor can 
dismiss and later refile the case to give him or herself more time, even if the 
court has refused to continue the initial trial.225 This infringes on the power 
given to the court, as a neutral party, to set the timing of the proceedings.226 
Moreover, it biases the proceedings in favor of the prosecution.227 The 
prosecutor has power over the timing of the trial and a stop-gap ability to 
grant him or herself an unauthorized continuance through dismissal and 
later refiling, whereas the defendant does not have the same power over the 
timing of the proceedings.228 
A prosecutor’s ability to essentially grant him or herself these 
unauthorized continuances “undermines defendants’ confidence in the 
justice system. Any defendant who has watched a prosecutor override a 
judge’s denial of a continuance invariably begins to question the integrity 
and fairness of the system.”229 Because it undermines defendants’ 
confidence in the judicial system and emphasizes prosecutorial power, 
seeing a prosecutor control the court’s power through dismissal and refiling 
can cause defendants to lose faith entirely in the justice system, making 
them more likely to accept a guilty plea regardless of their actual guilt or 
innocence.230 
While the tacking-and-tolling approach may still allow prosecutors to 
grant themselves unauthorized continuances, this approach lessens the risks 
significantly. As prosecutors still face the same speedy trial limitation under 
the tacking-and-tolling approach because the period does not restart when 
charges are dismissed and later refiled,231 they are much more limited in the 
length of time they can gain by dismissing and refiling. In contrast, 
dismissing and refiling under Colorado’s restarting approach grants 
prosecutors an entire new six-month period, unless the defendant is able to 
prove prosecutorial bad faith.232 Thus, the tacking-and-tolling approach 
better defends the court’s power from prosecutorial infringement. 
 
225. Thorp, supra note 98, at 448. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 446. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 446–47 (footnote omitted). 
230. Id. at 447; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra Part III(B). 
232. See supra Part II(C). 











6. The Tacking-and-Tolling Approach Is Consistent with Colorado’s 
Approach to Constitutional Speedy Trial Violations 
In contrast to its approach of restarting the window for statutory speedy 
trial calculations, Colorado does not restart the speedy trial period for 
constitutional233 speedy trial purposes, but rather essentially follows the 
tacking-and-tolling approach.234 For constitutional speedy trial purposes, 
Colorado includes the period between the initial filing of charges and their 
dismissal plus the period after charges are refiled, but does not count the 
period between dismissal and refiling, absent a showing of prosecutorial bad 
faith.235 The Colorado courts adopted this approach because they found it 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach for federal constitutional 
speedy trial calculations in United States v. MacDonald,236 as well as with 
the approaches of the “majority of courts in other jurisdictions.”237  
Because Colorado follows the restarting approach for statutory speedy 
trial purposes but follows the tacking-and-tolling approach for 
constitutional ones, Colorado’s statutory speedy trial calculation for 
dismissed and refiled charges is inconsistent with its constitutional 
calculation in the same case. Aside from needlessly complicating speedy 
trial cases, this inconsistency also contradicts the purpose of the statute, 
because the “speedy trial statute is intended to implement the constitutional 
right to a speedy trial.”238 It is inconsistent to use different calculations for 
the statute than the calculations used for the constitutional provision that the 
statute is meant to implement. Hence, to be consistent with its tacking-and-
tolling constitutional approach, Colorado should adopt a tacking-and-tolling 
 
233. As discussed in Part I(B), the Colorado Constitution echoes the Federal Constitution’s speedy 
trial protections. 
234. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
235. People v. Nelson, 360 P.3d 175, 182 (Colo. App. 2014); see also supra notes 61–62 and 
accompanying text. 
236. 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that the courts should not include the period between the 
government’s good-faith dismissal and refiling of the same charges when analyzing whether the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were violated). However, as a Colorado appellate court 
noted in People v. Nelson, MacDonald does not “directly” answer the question whether “the period from 
the initial filing of the charges until the dismissal of those charges is relevant.” Nelson, 360 P.3d at 182. 
Instead, the Nelson court held that MacDonald’s rationale indirectly “supports” the Nelson court’s 
conclusion that the period between the initial filing of charges and dismissal should be included in 
calculating the length of delay for constitutional speedy trial purposes. Id. But see United States v. Artez, 
290 F. App’x 203, 208 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that “[t]here appears to be some confusion whether 
the dismissal of an indictment prior to refiling for the same conduct pauses or resets the clock for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause” and noting contradicting cases applying 
MacDonald). 
237. Nelson, 360 P.3d at 181–82. 













approach for statutory speedy calculations when charges are dismissed and 
refiled.239 
Table 2 below provides a summary of the relative benefits and 
disadvantages of all four approaches for calculating the speedy trial period 
in Colorado, as described throughout Part IV.  
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that the tacking-and-tolling approach is most consistent with the legislative intent behind their respective 
states’ speedy trial statutes, namely preventing long pre-trial delays. See, e.g., State v. Sumstine, 478 
N.W.2d 240, 247 (Neb. 1991); State v. Bonarrigo, 402 N.E.2d 530, 534–35 (Ohio 1980). 
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240. This concern is mitigated somewhat by the escape hatches provided by Colorado’s speedy 
trial statute in cases of exceptional circumstances and/or unavailable evidence. See supra Part IV(D)(1). 
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V. PROPOSAL: COLORADO SHOULD ADOPT THE TACKING-AND-TOLLING 
APPROACH 
Colorado should abandon the restarting approach and adopt the tacking-
and-tolling approach for calculating the statutory speedy trial period when 
charges are dismissed and refiled.241 As the restarting approach was adopted 
by the courts and is not mandated by statute, the Colorado Supreme Court 
could overrule its previous decisions242 adopting the restarting approach and 
replace it with the tacking-and-tolling approach. The Colorado Supreme 
Court should overrule its judicially-adopted restarting approach the next 
time a defendant appeals the dismissal and refiling of the charges against 
him on statutory speedy trial grounds.243 While adopting the tacking-and-
tolling approach would require the court to reverse itself, the res judicata 
concerns are somewhat mitigated by the fact that adopting the tacking-and-
tolling approach for statutory speedy trial calculations would be consistent 
with the court’s approach to constitutional speedy trial calculations.244 
If Colorado’s courts fail to act, given the flaws in its current restarting 
approach, the Colorado legislature should consider adopting the tacking-
and-tolling approach by statute.245 The legislature could amend the current 
speedy trial statute246—which mandates that trials take place within six 
months and already includes certain types of periods to be excluded in 
calculating that six-month window247—to include that the speedy trial 
 
241. See supra Part IV and Table 2 for a summary of the arguments against the restarting and 
continuous approaches and in favor of the tacking-and-tolling approach. 
242. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for the Colorado judicial decisions adopting the 
restarting approach. 
243. For example, when the Arizona Supreme Court realized its judicially-adopted approach to 
calculating the statutory speedy trial window for dismissed and refiled charges was not working, the 
court overruled itself and judicially adopted a different approach. See supra Part IV(C)(b). Realizing 
that Colorado’s current restarting approach is not working in the interests of justice and efficiency, the 
Colorado Supreme Court could likewise overrule its judicially-adopted restarting approach and replace 
it with the tacking-and-tolling approach. 
244. See supra Part IV(D)(f); see also supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra Part IV and Table 2 for a summary of the arguments against the restarting approach 
and in favor of the tacking-and-tolling approach. 
246. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405 (West 2019). 
247. See supra Part II(B). 











period when charges are dismissed and refiled must be calculated using the 
tacking-and-tolling approach. 
VI. THE TACKING-AND-TOLLING APPROACH’S APPLICABILITY TO OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS WITH SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTES 
Speedy trial schemes are unique to each state due to each state’s different 
general speedy trial landscape, which consists of: the length of the state’s 
statutory speedy trial period (if the state has a statutory speedy trial period 
at all),248 the state’s criminal statutes of limitations, the state’s constitutional 
speedy trial provisions (if the state constitution includes such provisions), 
the state’s speedy trial case law, time periods excluded from the state’s 
statutory speedy trial period, and the state’s remedy for speedy trial 
violations, in addition to the state’s approach to calculating the speedy trial 
period when charges are dismissed and later refiled.249 Because each state’s 
speedy trial landscape is unique, this Note focused narrowly on only one 
state, Colorado, for the sake of clarity and specificity. Any consideration of 
the merits of the four approaches to calculating the statutory speedy trial 
window for refiled charges must be evaluated in light of the broader speedy 
trial landscape in that specific state, which primarily consists of the seven 
factors described above. 
For example, the importance of having a condensed speedy trial period 
lessens in states with relatively short criminal statutes of limitations. This is 
because a short criminal statute of limitations will generally force 
prosecutors to file charges within a relatively narrow window, thus 
decreasing the risk of a drawn-out delay before the trial. As another 
example, the restarting approach may be more workable in a state in which 
the courts more critically inquire into a prosecutor’s motives for dismissing 
and refiling the charges than Colorado’s courts do (which, as noted 
previously, generally accept the prosecutor’s motives as valid, given that a 
defendant has never met the burden of showing prosecutorial bad faith).250  
 
248. See supra Part IV(B) for a discussion of why a statutory speedy trial right is necessary due 
to Colorado’s broader speedy trial landscape.  
249. The list above is not intended to be exhaustive, but only to describe the most important factors 
in a state’s broader speedy trial landscape. However, other factors exist. For example, Colorado’s speedy 
trial clock begins to run when the defendant pleads not guilty, but not every state uses this same starting 
point. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2018) (the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 starts the federal 
seventy-day speedy trial clock from “the filing date (and making public) of the information or 
indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which 
such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs”). See supra Part IV(B) for a discussion of how each 
of these different speedy trial factors intersect to form the broader speedy trial landscape in Colorado; 
see also Joseph, supra note 75, at 649–56, for a list of extraconstitutional speedy trial protections by 
state. 












Additionally, a factor states should consider in determining the best 
approach is what time periods are statutorily excluded from the speedy trial 
period. For example, as mentioned in Part II(B), Colorado’s speedy trial 
statute allows prosecutors to exclude several delays from the six-month 
speedy trial period: interlocutory appeals, joining with a codefendant, 
unavailability of material evidence, and “exceptional circumstances” for 
felony trials.251 Since these escape hatches for appropriate cases exist, 
changing Colorado’s restarting approach to the slightly harsher tacking-
and-tolling approach would not fully foreclose courts’ and prosecutors’ 
ability to try cases when justice so demands, even when more than six 
months have passed from the initial not-guilty plea. However, in states with 
fewer or no escape hatches, the flexibility of the restarting approach would 
be more important. 
As a final example, a factor weighing in favor of an approach that is more 
lenient to prosecutors is whether the state has a relatively harsh remedy for 
speedy trial violations. In other words, a factor weighing in favor of a more 
lenient approach in Colorado is the fact that speedy trial violations act as a 
complete, not discretionary, bar on the later refiling of the same charges. In 
contrast, when courts have discretion to permit the refiling of charges 
following their dismissal due to a speedy trial violation,252 then a harsher 
approach, such as the continuous approach, could be balanced out by the 
court’s ability to permit refiling, even when the speedy trial period has 
elapsed. 
As demonstrated above, numerous factors unique to each state influence 
what the best approach to calculating the speedy trial period for dismissed 
and refiled charges is in that state. Thus, the best approach for each state 
depends on each state’s unique speedy trial landscape.253 
However, the relative benefits and drawbacks of each of the four 
approaches for calculating the speedy trial period, as described in Table 2 
and Part IV, are generally applicable to any state that provides a fixed 
speedy trial window by statute. Specifically, the tacking-and-tolling 
approach’s benefits of allowing prosecutors needed flexibility, but not 
unlimited discretion, in dismissing and refiling charges are broadly 
applicable, although such benefits must be considered in relation to an 
individual state’s criminal law system. Thus, each state should consider 
whether its current approach to calculating the speedy trial period for refiled 
charges best serves justice. 
 
251. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405(6); see supra Part II(B). 
252. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (allowing courts to dismiss charges with or without 
prejudice following a violation of the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974).  
253. See supra note 249 and accompanying text for a list of the most important factors influencing 
a state’s speedy trial landscape. 












Colorado’s current approach of allowing the speedy trial period to restart 
creates too large a loophole in the state’s statutory right to a speedy trial 
within six months because it grants too much leeway to prosecutors. As 
courts have yet to apply the exception to restarting upon a showing that the 
prosecution dismissed and refiled to circumvent the speedy mandate, the 
exception is too vague to provide sufficient notice to courts, prosecutors, 
and defendants about when the exception applies, if it ever does. Moreover, 
because the restarting approach forces courts to make fact-specific inquiries 
into the prosecution’s motives for dismissal and refiling and because it over-
incentivizes dismissals and refilings, the approach creates inefficiencies in 
the justice system. It also permits prosecutors to infringe on the powers of 
the courts by essentially allowing prosecutors to grant themselves 
unauthorized continuances. Thus, the restarting approach is inadequate. 
While the continuous approach better protects defendants’ speedy trial 
rights, it is too inflexible. The continuous approach creates too harsh a 
timeline for dismissal and refiling, even in cases where such refiling is 
appropriate. Moreover, the continuous approach has proven unworkable in 
practice in Arizona. 
Therefore, Colorado should adopt the tacking-and-tolling approach. This 
approach best balances the countervailing interests of society and 
defendants in speedy trials, while still rarely allowing the guilty to escape 
justice on technical speedy trial violations instead of the merits of their 
cases. Additionally, the tacking-and-tolling approach is most consistent 
with Colorado’s constitutional speedy trial rights. Lastly, this approach best 
incentivizes efficiency in the justice system.  
No approach is perfect. While the tacking-and-tolling approach is not as 
inflexible for prosecutors as the continuous approach, it is still much more 
inflexible than the restarting approach. The tacking-and-tolling approach 
does not allow the speedy trial clock to restart even where dismissal and 
refiling is appropriate, but rather only pauses the clock, and so has more 
potential to allow the guilty to escape on a speedy violation technicality than 
does the restarting approach. Moreover, the tacking-and-tolling approach, 
while allowing less prosecutorial discretion than the restarting approach, 
still allows more prosecutorial discretion in dismissal and refiling than does 
the continuous approach, as prosecutors may still dismiss and refile charges 
in order to pause the speedy trial clock.  
Despite these drawbacks, the tacking-and-tolling approach provides the 
best middle ground between the extremes of the too inflexible continuous 












should abandon its current restarting approach and adopt the tacking-and-
tolling approach.  
Moreover, while each state must evaluate its approach for calculating the 
speedy trial period when charges are dismissed and refiled in light of its 
broader speedy trial landscape,254 other states with speedy trial statutes 
providing concrete speedy trial periods should consider adopting the 
tacking-and-tolling approach for calculating the speedy trial period when 
charges are dismissed and refiled. 
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254.  See supra note 249 and accompanying text for a list of the most important factors in creating 
a state’s speedy trial landscape. 
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